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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to be scrutinized for its inability 
to meet its mission mandate as outlined by the Homeland Security Act of 2002  This 
study looked at two of DHS’s most important functions—intelligence and emergency 
management.  Problems that constrain DHS’s ability to play a relevant role in the 
intelligence community stem from limitations imposed on the organization in the early 
phase of creation; the missed opportunity of adding the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
to its organizational structure; and the poor relationship it has with state and local fusion 
centers.  FEMA presents a similar set of challenges whereas the agency has served as an 
independent organization for much of its existence.  Including FEMA in the DHS merger 
has downgraded the agency’s ability to prepare and respond to all-hazards.  The call is to 
reestablish the organization as a stand-alone agency with direct links to the president.  
DHS’s inability to effectively perform two of its most important tasks requires lawmakers 
to review their 2002 decision and decide if an organizational change is in order.  They 
may find that the way forward for DHS is to downsize and refocus its mission on border 
security. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis sets out to better understand the role of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) as the nation’s leader in protecting the American people and U.S. 
resources from terrorist attacks.  The overarching question that drives this research is: 
Has DHS, as a cabinet-level entity, outlived its usefulness today, more than 10 years after 
the Sept. 11 attacks?  
Specifically, this thesis looks at the two most significant missions given to DHS: 
intelligence and emergency management.  This thesis recognizes that there are many 
other agencies that make up DHS; however, those other major functions like the Coast 
Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and the Transportation and Security Agency can 
be researched independently in the future.  The goal of this thesis is to understand the 
importance of intelligence and emergency management as the most important but also 
most divergent roles assigned to DHS, how they fit within the organizational construct, 
and whether these functions would be most effective in another department or agency or 
worst case, if they are needed at all.  The overarching goal of DHS is to secure the 
homeland, and this thesis examines whether DHS is the right organization for the job. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Dozens of agencies charged with homeland security will now be located 
within one Cabinet department with the mandate and legal authority to 
protect our people. America will be better able to respond to any future 
attacks, to reduce our vulnerability and, most important, prevent the 
terrorists from taking innocent American lives.1 
— President George W. Bush, November 25, 2002 
 
The quote above shows the sense of urgency to establish a single organization 
equipped to protect the American people from a new form of warfare—terrorism 
                                                 
1 George W. Bush, “Comments at signing of Homeland Security Act 2002,” http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021125-6.html.  
 2 
conducted inside U.S. borders.  That single organization was the Department of 
Homeland Security.  Ten years later, DHS continues to be an organization scrutinized for 
its inability to meet its mission mandate as outlined in the Homeland Security Act 2002.  
It is a product of a significant political push, by Congress, to establish an organization 
that would be responsible for preventing future failures that could lead to a repeat of the 
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  This thesis 
reviews the creation of the organization and some of the challenges that were realized at 
its inception.  Second, this study reviews the role of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).  It analyzes its relationship with 
other members of the intelligence community, as well as, state-established fusion centers.  
Review of this critical task will help determine if DHS has improved its capability, or 
not, to prevent future attacks.  Finally, emergency management has no traditional ties to 
preventing terrorism, yet the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was 
added to the organization created to do so.  Therefore, this thesis explores the role of 
FEMA and its effectiveness before and after DHS. 
Critics note that there are significant impediments embedded within DHS’s 
organizational structure that may lead to the demise of the organization.  These 
impediments include:  
• Too many different organizations with different mission sets. 
• All organizations cannot be tasked with a mission of fighting terrorism 
across the board. 
• The span of control for this large organization will make effective 
management and oversight hard to accomplish.2 
Exploring each of these aspects will help determine whether, after 10 years, DHS 
is still a relevant, viable, and necessary organization.   
C. PROBLEMS   
The Department of Homeland Security has become one of the largest departments 
in the federal government, but it has not reached its full potential as expected by the 
                                                 
2 David Rittgers, “Abolish the Department of Homeland Security,” Policy Analysis, no. 683, 
(September 11, 2011), CATO Institute, 1-6. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=686964. 
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Homeland Security Act of 2002.  One of the main problems involves how the department 
was organized.  Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, there was an immediate 
recognition that the United States, as a whole, was ill-prepared for such an attack.  The 
country had several different agencies in place that were responsible for ensuring the 
nation’s safety and security, but the necessary level of coordination and cooperation was 
conspicuously missing.  The Department of Homeland Security was subsequently formed 
in 2003, elevating the former Office of Homeland Security to a cabinet-level position.  
This department was created, as shown in Figure 1, by pulling together 22 different 
governmental agencies and realigning them under one umbrella with a new mission to 
prevent the next major terrorist attack in the United States.  
Table 1.   Twenty-two Agencies Transferred to DHS.   
After “Who Joined DHS?,” from http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs. 
(continued on next page) 
 
Agency location prior to DHS Agency locations within DHS 
The U.S. Customs Service (Treasury) 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection - inspection, 
border and ports of entry responsibilities 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement - 
customs law enforcement responsibilities 
The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (Justice) 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection - inspection 
functions and the U.S. Border Patrol 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement - 
immigration law enforcement: detention and 
removal, intelligence, and investigations 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services - 
adjudications and benefits programs 
The Federal Protective Service 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement until 
2009); currently resides within the National 
Protection and Programs Directorate 
The Transportation Security 
Administration (Transportation) Transportation Security Administration 
Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center (Treasury) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (part)(Agriculture) 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection - agricultural 
imports and entry inspections 
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Office for Domestic Preparedness (Justice) Responsibilities distributed within FEMA 
The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Strategic National Stockpile and the 
National Disaster Medical System (HHS) 
Returned to Health and Human Services, July, 
2004 
Nuclear Incident Response Team (Energy) Responsibilities distributed within FEMA 
Domestic Emergency Support Teams 
(Justice) Responsibilities distributed within FEMA 
National Domestic Preparedness Office 
(FBI) Responsibilities distributed within FEMA 
CBRN Countermeasures Programs 
(Energy) Science & Technology Directorate 
Environmental Measurements Laboratory 
(Energy) Science & Technology Directorate 
National BW Defense Analysis Center 
(Defense) Science & Technology Directorate 
Plum Island Animal Disease Center 
(Agriculture) Science & Technology Directorate 
Federal Computer Incident Response 
Center (GSA) 
US-CERT, Office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications in the National Protection 
and Programs Directorate 
National Communications System 
(Defense) 
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications in the 
National Protection and Programs Directorate 
National Infrastructure Protection Center 
(FBI) 
Dispersed throughout the Department, 
including Office of Operations Coordination and 
Office of Infrastructure Protection 
Energy Security and Assurance Program 
(Energy) 
Integrated into the Office of Infrastructure 
Protection 
U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Coast Guard 
U.S. Secret Service U.S. Secret Service 
Table 1. (continued from previous page) 
 
The formation of DHS was the largest governmental reorganization since the 
combining of the armed services into the Department of Defense in 1947.3  DHS’s 
creation also spawned an enormous and convoluted web of congressional oversight.  
                                                 
3 “Homeland Security Department,” Washington Post,  accessed  Dec. 7, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/homeland-security-department/gIQALxPx4O_topic.html. 
 5 
Having to provide reports to more than 100 congressional committees and subcommittees 
has contributed to the department’s inefficiencies and ineffectiveness.4   
In the immediate aftermath of such a large reorganization, one can expect 
problems such as difficulty in cross-functional coordination, reduced morale within the 
different functions because of a perceived loss of identity, and uncertainty surrounding 
specific agency program viability due to new budget competition.  Ten years later, DHS 
is still dealing with these organizational challenges.  It also continues to struggle to find 
its identity—and its purpose—as its mission focus shifts from terrorism to “all-hazards”5 
and then back to terrorism.  
A review of the literature suggests that a need exists to link the intelligence 
community with state, local, tribal, and private entities to ensure top-to-bottom 
cooperation in securing the nation.  But the question of how to do so effectively still 
remains.  This thesis contends that linking the IC to the state and local level does not have 
to be performed as part and parcel of a bigger bureaucracy.  What is discovered is that the 
current relationship between state-established fusion centers and DHS is neither perfect 
nor necessary to improve coordination.  President Bush only intended DHS to be a 
consumer of intelligence and not a leader in the field.  He outlined his expectation in his 
DHS proposal where he states, “The Department would be a full partner and consumer of 
all intelligence-generating agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, National 
Security Agency and the FBI.”6  Additionally, he wanted DHS to function as a 
clearinghouse for all things intelligence and be responsible for “ensuring information 
from the FBI is analyzed side-by-side with all other intelligence.”7 This arrangement 
                                                 
4 Paul Rosenzweig, Jenna Baker McNeill, and James Jay Carafano, “Stopping the Chaos:  A Proposal 
for Reorganization of Congressional Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security,” Heritage 
Foundation WebMemo 1, no. 3046 (November 4, 2010), Homeland Security Digital Library, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=14444. 
5 All Hazards as defined by a FEMA factsheet:  An all-hazards approach refers to preparedness for 
terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies within the United States.  It is also deemed as not 
all-inclusive and the application of this approach varies from regional area to regional area.  In this regard, 
all-hazards may or may not include terrorism.  See Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (502) Factsheet at:  
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/cpg_502_factsheet_sept_%209.pdf.  
6 George W. Bush, “The Department of Homeland Security,” Department of Homeland Security 
website. 14,  http://www.dhs.gov/proposal-create-department-homeland-security 
7 Ibid. 
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places DHS at the center of Homeland Security Intelligence; however, this relationship 
has become more of a roadblock than a pathway to actionable intelligence.  If the analysis 
has already been accomplished by long-standing U.S. intelligence institutions, what more 
does DHS have to offer?  The Department is an amalgam of many agencies that may or 
may not have had a significant intelligence role in the past.  Despite not having a 
historical link within the walls of intelligence, DHS moves forward, trying to establish 
itself as a leader in information sharing.  Information sharing is not intelligence; it is the 
cross-flow of intelligence information to other agencies so all can prepare and respond if 
necessary.  Only having a role as the information sharing leader, DHS will only be as 
credible and relevant as the information it receives.  What the organization needs is a role 
in collecting intelligence and then analyzing that data alongside other intelligence.  
Without the ability to collect data, DHS will always be a powerless middleman in the 
process.  With a mandate of preventing the next attack, this limitation places the 
organization at a disadvantage and increases the risk of failing to “connect the dots” 
similarly to September 10, 2001.   
On the other end of the DHS mission spectrum is emergency management.  A 
review of FEMA shows that the organization has always been an agency with direct links 
to the President.  Adding this agency to DHS’s hierarchy hinders FEMA’s mission 
because it creates situations that reduces its capacity and capability.  FEMA’s ability to 
create a more resilient nation is heavily dependent on the budget it receives.  The 
preponderance of FEMA’s budget is linked to the Disaster Relief Fund, which is used to 
provide federal grants to areas following a disaster or before an event to help mitigate the 
resulting or potential effects.8  Following the signing of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, FEMA’s budget was now controlled by a different federal entity that was built to 
detect, prevent, respond, and recover from terrorist events.  Now, FEMA’s budget is 
subject to reallocation to fund other Departmental priorities designed to deter future 
attacks. 
                                                 
8 FEMA, “Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency Disaster Relief 
Fund Fiscal Year 2013 Congressional Justification,” 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/budget/11f_fema_disaster_relief_fund_dhs_fy13_cj.pdf.  
 7 
FEMA regained some of its autonomy when the Post Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act 2006 was signed.  This act limits DHS Secretary’s ability to 
“substantially or significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of the 
Agency or the capability of the Agency.”9  Moreover, the Secretary must abide by the 
rules and ensure FEMA is funded so that it can effectively accomplish its mission.10  
Still, DHS is once again a middleman, now interposed between FEMA and its grant 
recipients.  Having FEMA under DHS requires the agency, now, to reach back to 
Washington to request authority to respond and to what extent it can respond.11   
D. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis contends that President George W. Bush had the organizational 
structure right following the Sept. 11 attacks.  Shortly after these events, he established 
the Office of Homeland Security (OHS), which functioned as the president’s eyes and 
ears.  This office could pull the necessary information and provide an analytic view of 
potential threats without having to worry about the next hurricane or the number of 
immigrants granted citizenship, as the department now must do.  The transition of OHS 
to DHS ignited a bureaucratic process which in and of itself comes with complications.  
Complications such as the need for Congressional approval of senior leaders and budgets 
or the turf battles as other departments fight to maintain its current relevance.  Had the 
administration maintained the OHS construct, these complications would not exist and 
the nation would have a streamlined and focused hierarchy to combat terrorism in the 
homeland. 
Some suggest that DHS, at a minimum, should release FEMA and allow it to 
become its own separate entity again.  This step will free up the Department to focus on 
detecting and deterring future terror plots by securing the borders through the Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) and Coast Guard, and disrupting terrorism links to narcotics 
                                                 
9 GPO, “Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006,” 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ295/pdf/PLAW-109publ295.pdf.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Brian Naylor, “Should FEMA Remain Part of Homeland Security?” February 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100012612. 
 8 
trafficking through the Immigration, Customs and Enforcement (ICE) agency.  
Regardless of the magnitude of a disaster or catastrophe, emergency management is 
emergency management, no less and no more.  FEMA is capable of preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from all hazards, including events that result from 
terrorism, but it must wait for an event to happen before it really swings into action.   
Similarly, DHS should relinquish its role in intelligence.  Currently, its role in 
intelligence stems from the federal funding stream it provides to state run fusion centers 
and not from collecting data to thwart attacks.  There is no need for a new bureaucracy to 
fund operations when existing agencies with a proven track record in intelligence can do 
the same thing to the same or better effect.  
E. FOUR QUESTIONS 
A few significant questions continue to arise with regards to the utility of DHS, 
including: How effective is DHS and should it be abolished?  Why did not DHS include 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and without it, how well has DHS performed its 
intelligence mission?  Finally, should FEMA be removed from the organizational 
structure? 
To address the first question of effectiveness and abolishing the organization, 
David Rittgers argues in his paper, “Abolish the Department of Homeland Security,” that 
DHS was “ill-conceived” and the plan to build a more resilient United States of America 
did not require erecting a new bureaucracy.  He outlines the complexities surrounding the 
organization as it tries to cohere out of the conditions of its creation—what such other 
experts as Stephen Flynn have dubbed a “corporate merger.”12  Furthermore, Rittgers 
adds that “domestic counterterrorism is a law enforcement function, and keeping 
government within the bounds dictated by the Constitution is both more likely to 
apprehend real terrorists and avoid labeling large portions of the American public as 
threats to national security.”13   
                                                 
12 Stephen Flynn, “Homeland Insecurity:  Disaster at DHS,” The American Interest (May/June 2009), 
20. 
13 David Rittgers, “Abolish the Department of Homeland Security,” Policy Analysis, No 683, 
(September 11, 2011), CATO Institute, 17, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=686964. 
 9 
The second question involves the missed opportunity to give DHS a stronger and 
relevant presence within the IC.  Some have expressed that in the haste to establish DHS; 
one significant organization was left out—the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  As the 
story goes, 9/11 was a result of the FBI and CIA failing to share information which may 
have led to foiling the plot.  DHS was expected to be the answer to this communication 
and coordination problem.  But how can this brand new bureaucratic organization gain 
legitimacy when it has no history or connection with the already established intelligence 
community?  The addition of the FBI would have given the department the legitimacy it 
needed.  Without this main component of the intelligence community, the Department’s 
job is harder and more constrained, especially when the legislation that created the 
organization limited its capability to investigate and prosecute terrorists.14  This oversight 
by the administration at the time, intentionally or not, severely limited DHS’s ability to 
fully protect the homeland.   
So what is DHS’s role in the intelligence community?  As a collective, the IC 
constantly attempts to improve collection, analysis, and sharing of critical data necessary 
for securing the homeland.  DHS assumes a role in this process through its Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis. I&A is responsible for the following missions: “1. Identify and 
assess the nature of terrorist threats to the homeland; 2. Detect and deter threats of 
terrorism against the United States; 3. Understand such threats in light of actual and 
potential vulnerabilities of the homeland.”15 Although I&A is designated as the lead in 
providing critical assessment of information to the President to help detect, deter, 
prevent, respond to, and recover from any event that is natural or man-made, many argue 
it has not been as effective as expected.   
As Representative Mike Thompson notes, “DHS’s place in the US intelligence 
architecture has been a topic of congressional oversight since its creation and remains a 
                                                 
14 Homeland Security Act 2002, PUBLIC LAW 107–296, 6 US Code (2002): Section 201(d), 1A, B, 
C, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=614. 
15 Ibid., sec 201: 1 A, B, C. 
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work in progress without final resolution.”16  This comment is derived from a report 
submitted by the Aspen Group (The Group) on the state of DHS intelligence.  The report 
notes the redundancies that exist between I&A and the FBI with regards to 
responsibilities for domestic intelligence gathering and analysis.  The Group makes no 
distinction between national security and homeland security.  All things that fall under 
homeland security, such as border protection, infrastructure protection, interaction with 
state and local law enforcement agencies, and transportation have all been lumped 
together as part of the national security architecture.17 If national security includes all 
these task that are also considered Homeland Security, then why do we need a separate 
department when we already have the National Security Agency (NSA), National 
Security Council (NSC), CIA, FBI, and Department of State (DOS)—each have major 
roles in protecting national security?  Additionally, the Group notes that DHS must focus 
on other missions outside of terrorism.  Currently, preventing terrorism is being handled 
by traditional intelligence entities; therefore, DHS must determine where its efforts can 
be most effective and “value added” while avoiding areas already in the purview of other 
agencies.18   
The final question seeks to understand whether the nation needs the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency to be part of DHS.  FEMA has been a staple of 
American society; its existence can be traced back to the old civil defense organization 
that was responsible for ensuring the nation could prepare and recover from a nuclear 
attack during the Cold War era.19  Many have debated the necessity of FEMA as part of 
DHS.  Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) was an early proponent of removing FEMA from 
DHS’s organizational structure following FEMA’s botched response to Hurricane 
Katrina.  He felt the organization lacked qualified leadership.20  Even former employees 
                                                 
16 The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human 
Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, “Role of DHS in the IC:  A Report by the Aspen Institute,” 
Homeland Security Digital Library, (January 18, 2012), 5. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=697591. 
17 Ibid., 10. 
18 Ibid., 10–11. 
19 Harry V. Martin, “Secret Government,” http://dmc.members.sonic.net/sentinel/gvcon6.html.  
20 National Low Income Housing Commission, “Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 
2006:  Overview of Housing,” http://www.nlihc.org/doc/080906.pdf.  
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of the agency, like Andrew Sachs, felt that aligning FEMA under DHS stifled the 
organization’s ability to make quick decisions in times of crises.  He further notes that it 
is important for decision makers to be on the ground in an emergency so he or she can get 
a true sense of what is going on and how to respond.21   
On the other hand, there are those who advocate that FEMA is integral to DHS’s 
mission.  Secretary Napolitano explained after accepting the job that she would ensure 
FEMA is capable of meeting the tasks at hand so that “where the organizational box 
goes… loses a lot of its relevance.”22  Jenna McNeil, from the Heritage Foundation, 
tends to agree with Secretary Napolitano as she offers five reasons why FEMA should 
remain part of DHS and proposes that the Administration should “create more 
integration” within DHS so the different components can better “communicate and work 
together.”23 
Arguments from both sides are very compelling; however, those who support 
DHS as it stands today seem to fall in line with the United States’ model of building 
bureaucracy as an answer to new problems.  Has DHS been successful in achieving its 
mission?  Well, the 2012 report from the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence doesn’t seem to think so.  The department is viewed as a duplication of effort 
while the FBI thwarts attacks.  Moreover, FEMA has proven to be on the wrong track 
following Katrina.  It struggles with getting qualified leaders to help guide the 
organization through turbulent times.  This includes the initial DHS secretaries, Tom 
Ridge and Michael Chertoff, who removed the preparedness grant programs thereby 
inhibiting FEMA’s ability to provide support.24  FEMA needs more autonomy and a 
                                                 
21 Brian Naylor, “Should FEMA Remain Part of Homeland Security?” February 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/template/story/story.php?storyId=100012612. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Jenna Baker McNeil and Jessica Zuckerman, “Five Reasons FEMA Should Stay at DHS,” The 
Heritage Foundation, no 2736, (December 15, 2009). 1-2; Jenna Baker McNeil, “Restructuring FEMA:  
Stand-Alone FEMA Would Not Make Cents,” The Heritage Foundation, no 2316, (February 27, 2009), 1–
2. 
24 U.S. Senate, “Special Report:  A Nation Still Unprepared,” Homeland Security Digital Library, 222,  
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=462746. 
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renewed link to the President who is ultimately responsible for the safety and well-being 
of all Americans.   
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis involves two different methodologies.  The first method reviews the 
Department of Homeland Security’s history and examines how it has progressed since its 
inception in 2003. Included in this method will be an in-depth look at two of DHS’s most 
important functions—intelligence and emergency management. Analysis of these two 
functions helped determine if the Department is meeting the intent of its charter or does 
current dysfunction suggest more still needs to be done.   
The second methodology uses case studies to examine how well DHS has 
performed these two important functions.  Two cases involve FEMA’s response during 
Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina.  These case studies included analysis of the roles and 
responsibilities before FEMA joined the Department and shifts in those roles and 
responsibilities following the creation of DHS.  Additionally, to help understand the role 
and responsibilities of DHS in the intelligence arena, this thesis used the Christmas Day 
bombing attempt as a case study to examine the role of DHS during this incident.  Other 
plots were reviewed, although not in great detail, as a barometer of how active DHS is in 
the prevention of attacks and the protection of American citizens’ lives.  
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is broken into four chapters.  Following this introduction, Chapter II 
focuses on one of the Department’s core functions, intelligence.  Various sources are 
used to examine whether the Department’s Intelligence and Analysis directorate is 
meeting the intent of established laws that empower the organization to be a lead agency 
in protecting the homeland.  Included in this analysis is a review of how DHS fits inside 
of the intelligence community.  Next, there is an evaluation of intelligence failures and a 
look at DHS’s role in 40 thwarted plots since September 11.  Then the chapter addresses 
the question of whether or not DHS should have received oversight of the FBI. 
Furthermore, it tackles the ongoing debate of whether DHS’s relationship with fusion 
centers is functional and strong enough to make DHS relevant in the intelligence 
 13 
community.  Finally, the chapter reviews a 2012 report entitled, Federal Support For and 
Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers. This report was produced by the United 
States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs.  In it is a breakdown of the current relationship 
between DHS and fusion centers to include how well they operate with each other and 
what problems seem to plague the relationship.  
Chapter III examines another core function, emergency management, as it is 
performed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  The intent of this agency is 
to ensure that the nation is ready and capable of recovering from any natural or man-
made disasters.  This chapter provides the historical context of FEMA’s creation and 
performance before and after being placed inside DHS.  In this connection, there is an 
analysis of FEMA’s response to Hurricanes Andrew (pre-DHS) and Katrina (post-DHS).  
This analysis reviews the different dynamics, such as organizational leadership, that 
played a major role in the response successes or failures.  The analysis helped determine 
whether FEMA and its mission of emergency management should remain one of the 
Department’s core functions.   
Finally, Chapter IV provides the conclusion and recommendations centered on the 
restructuring of the department and ways to improve mission effectiveness.  It revisits the 
main question—whether DHS has outlived its usefulness—and reviews the analysis in 
the area of intelligence and emergency management to help draw reasonable conclusions.  
After reviewing the literature, it is clear that DHS has outlived its usefulness.  It is 
irrelevant in the intelligence arena because the FBI was not added to the organization.  
The FBI would have provided the legitimacy that the organization needed to establish 
equal footing inside the community.  Additionally, DHS is only a funding source for 
fusion centers.  The department does not create day-to-day intelligence agendas for these 
centers, this is done either internally at the direction of the local center directors or state 
governors.  In essence the department’s objective of syncing all things intelligence was 
eroded at its creation and has yet to see any congressional activity that would change it.  
Emergency management would also be better served outside of the department.  FEMA’s 
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focus would return to ensuring State and local governments are prepared for and can 
respond to any and all disasters, to include those resulting from terrorist acts.   
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II. WILL DHS EVER PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THE 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY? 
Following the brutal, unprovoked surprise attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon in 2001, processes and procedures for gathering, analyzing, and sharing 
intelligence were placed atop the political discussion docket.  The establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Intelligence and Analysis directorate was meant to 
improve information sharing among the members of the intelligence community, state, 
and local governments; however, it has contributed to reduced cross-functional sharing of 
data because of new bureaucratic turf wars. Many of these intelligence gathering and 
sharing issues already existed between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
Central Intelligence Agency but now, with the addition of DHS, the questions of who 
does what, when, where, and how in the intelligence realm is even more complicated.  
DHS continues to portray its role in the IC as important and significant.  Michael 
Chertoff, the second Secretary of DHS, explained that “intelligence is at the heart of 
everything DHS does.”25  He continued to explain that the uniqueness of the 
organizational structure has given the department a daily intelligence function that is sure 
to provide actionable intelligence helping to keep America safe.26  This chapter will 
examine the role of the Department of Homeland Security in the intelligence community 
and determine if it is preventing terrorist attacks as expected.  
A. DHS AS PART OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY  
The United States has built a very robust intelligence framework, with an 
intelligence community that consists of seventeen agencies, including:  the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central 
Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National 
Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of 
                                                 
25 Charles Allen, “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century:  Implications for Homeland Security,” The 




Investigation.27  This network is mandated to ensure the safety and security of all 
Americans as well as the nation’s critical infrastructure.  Every agency must work 
independently and cooperatively in order to be successful.  Each has similar tasks that 
include the production and collection of information, intelligence sharing, and the 
creation of capabilities to protect against domestic or international hostilities.28   
Actionable intelligence is the “demands on intelligence for foreknowledge and for 
precision sufficient for interdiction,”29 and because of this demand, DHS developed 
Homeland Security Intelligence (HSINT).  It is much different than the other “ints” in 
that it involves the interaction and information sharing between state, local, tribal, private 
industry partners and the federal government.  HSINT gives DHS a role in the IC as it 
becomes the conduit for passing information that originate at the local levels but has 
national implications and vice-versa.30  
One limiting factor that has plagued DHS is its inability to generate or collect 
intelligence.  As part of the merger, DHS received organizations that could be considered 
quasi intelligence agencies—TSA, CBP and ICE.  Neither of these organizations played a 
significant role inside the intelligence community before joining DHS.  Therefore their 
relevance and know-how was limited and contributed to DHS’s overall ineffectiveness in 
intelligence.   
Other collection platforms, such as human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery 
intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and geospatial intelligence 
(GEOINT), have been the primary means for gathering data for analysis.  Each one 
helped shape the national political framework in response to Soviet aggression during the 
                                                 
27 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence:  From Secrets to Policy (Washington D.C., SAGE/CQ Press: 
2012), 35. 
28 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “U.S. National Intelligence:  An Overview 2011,” 7-
8;  The remaining agencies that make up the IC are:  Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Department 
of Energy, Department of State, Department of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Marine Corps 
Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Department of Homeland Security, and Coast Guard Intelligence.  See: 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic.  
29 Jennifer, Sims, “Understanding Friends and Enemies:  The Context for American Intelligence 
Reform,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, ed. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, D.C., 
Georgetown University Press: 2005), 26. 
30 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 285. 
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Cold War.  Unlike those stovepipe collection capabilities, HSINT is derived from day-to-
day information compiled and analyzed by almost anyone, but it does not gain relevance 
until it has been “fused together” to make sense of the puzzle pieces as they are 
assembled into a completed form.31 
Although HSINT involves the collection of data, a lack of independence is its 
major flaw.  To clarify, DHS does not have agents who are out traversing local cities, 
suburbs, towns or villages gathering information to analyze.  The information the 
department acquires comes from other sources.  Charles Allen, the first Undersecretary of 
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, confessed that DHS takes “advantage 
of the work of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) all source, integrated 
assessments of terrorist threats…we look at threat information from the NCTC, from the 
FBI, CIA and elsewhere in the Intelligence Community as well as from the DHS 
components.”32  DHS appears to enjoy riding the coat tails of others in the community.  
Getting information from other sources is part of information sharing, but DHS’s analysis 
will only be as good as the data points received.  The department is operating at the 
mercy of others, which in the long run may prove detrimental to its survival.   
B. DHS INTELLIGENCE FAILURES 
The department has experienced numerous intelligence failures throughout its 
nearly 10-year existence.  For example, the Christmas Day bombing attempt that 
occurred on December 25, 2009, was a near-disastrous event carried out by a young 
Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who volunteered to conduct a mission against the 
West on behalf of Al Qaeda.  Specifically, he volunteered to board a plane with plastic 
explosives in his underwear, which he meant to detonate on the flight from Amsterdam to 
Detroit.  He was working for a Yemeni cell that publicly announced, through the Al 
Jazeera network, that it was at war with America, and those who labeled themselves as 
                                                 
31 Allen, 4. 
32 Allen, 5.   
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friends of the infidel state should be very concerned for their own safety.33  In other 
words, TSA arguably ought to have known he was coming.  Instead, the man was 
subdued by several passengers on the flight who had noted his odd behavior leading up to 
the attempted bombing. 
The Christmas day “underwear bombing” attempt sent shockwaves across the 
country. Americans wanted to know how a Nigerian man, whose own father had 
approached U.S. officials in Nigeria with his concerns about his son’s rising radicalism, 
could board a commercial airliner, destined for a major city in the United States, with 
explosives hidden in his underwear, and not be detected?  Had the lessons of Richard 
Reid’s Christmas 2001 attempt to bring down a jetliner with explosives hidden in his 
shoe not registered with those officials charged with keeping American air travel safe—
that is, beyond requiring all passengers to remove their shoes at the X-ray machine?  
With the millions of dollars that had been spent since Sept. 11 to acquire systems that are 
designed to detect weapons of this magnitude; a close call like this should have been 
prevented.34 
So who is to blame for such an egregious oversight?  Many lawmakers voiced 
their concerns with the leadership of the department, especially when Secretary 
Napolitano claimed that the failed attempt really showed that “the system worked.”35  
There were strong calls for Secretary Napolitano’s resignation.  The community was right 
in questioning her ability to lead.  How could she claim success for a failed attempt that 
could have easily ended in a major disaster—and was interrupted not by experts in her 
agency but by a couple of sharp-eyed coach passengers and a flight attendant with a fire 
                                                 
33 Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt, and Mark Mazzetti, “Review of Jet Bomb Plot Shows More Missed 
Cues,” New York Times, January 17, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/18/us/18intel.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Politico, “Napolitano: The System worked,” Politico Live, December 27, 2009,  
http://www.politico.com/blogs/politicolive/1209/Napolitano_The_system_worked.html.  
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extinguisher?36  If Umar had been stopped before boarding the plane, then “mission 
accomplished” would be in order; but, critics said, DHS’s inability to detect this device 
proves the department is not on the cutting edge and has limited capability and capacity 
for preventing attacks.37   
In fact, the intelligence community had warned that an explosive device, similar 
to one used in an assassination attempt in Yemen, could be smuggled onto a plane and 
detonated.  There were also reports of chatter out of Yemen that Al Qaeda was looking 
for someone to carry out a potential attack against the United States on Christmas Day.  
Many of these reports pointed to Nigeria as a potential source of providing a volunteer 
for this mission.  Nearly one month before the attempted plot, the name Umar Farouk 
was noted among international intelligence operators as a potential volunteer.  Then there 
was the report by Dr. Alhaji Umaru Mutallab, Umar Farouk Abulmutallab’s father, to the 
U.S. embassy in Nigeria that his son was missing and he may be affiliated with an 
extremist group out of Yemen.  This piece of information was shared and Umar was 
placed into the 550,000-person Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), which 
was used to track potential terrorists.  Based on the data points received, it is hard to 
imagine that DHS was unable to prevent the Christmas Day plot.   
But there was one problem that hampered any such action, namely that each of 
the critical pieces of information was in the hands of other agencies.  Not one, to include 
DHS’s Intelligence and Analysis directorate, was able to piece all the data together in 
                                                 
36Kendra Marr of Politico published an article title, “System did not work, Napolitano Revises her 
comments.”  In this article Secretary Napolitano admits that the system failed in this instance and there was 
work that still needed to be done. 
(http://www.politico.com/politico44/perm/1209/system_did_not_work_3b634a50-3a24-4e4e-8467-
079e76a6d1d0.html  This reversal came as a result of increased scrutiny by members of Congress and a 
Presidential directive to review the terrorist watch list system and air travel screening procedures 
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-preliminary-information-his-ongoing-
consultation-about-detroit ). 
37 Fox News, “Democrats Join Call for Napolitano to Step Down Following Failed Attack,” January, 
1, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/01/01/democrats-join-calls-napolitano-step-following-
failed-attack/.   
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order to get a real sense of what was about to transpire.38  There were plenty of dots but, 
once again, no one agency clearly tasked to or capable of connecting them.  Well, that 
one agency should have been DHS. 
Since Sept. 11 there have been at least forty recorded—and thwarted—attempts to 
inflict terror on the civilian population of the United States. Table 1, below, shows each 
of these 40 attempts and the lead agency involved.39  What can be derived from this table 
is that of the 40 attempts, none of them indicate involvement by the Department of 
Homeland Security.  Instead, it shows that the FBI is accomplishing DHS’s assigned task 
of preventing terrorism.  
Table 2.   Thwarted Attacks since 9/11 (derived from the journal entry in the 
Backgrounder, September 7, 2011, titled “40 Terror Plots Foiled Since 
9/11:  Combating Complacency in the Long War on Terror”) 
  
THWARTED ATTACK DATE LEAD AGENCY 
Richard Reid (“Shoe 
Bomber”) 
December 2001 Passengers and Crew 
Jose Padilla  May 2002 FBI 
Lackawanna Six September 2002 FBI 
Iyman Faris (Brooklyn 
Bridge Plot) 
May 2003 FBI 
Virginia Jihad Network  
(“Paintball Terrorist”) 
June 2003 Not recorded 
Nuradin M. Abdi  
(local shopping mall) 
November 2003 Not recorded 
Dhiren Barot  
(New York Stock Exchage 
Plot) 
August 2004 Not recorded 
Subway near  
Madison Square Garden 
August 2004 New York City Police Department 
Pakistani diplomat  August 2004 FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
                                                 
38 Lipton, “Review of Jet bomb plot,” New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/18/us/18intel.html?pagewanted=all ; Diane Russel Ong Junio, “Report 
on the Attempted Bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 Christmas Day Plot,” International Centre 
For Political Violence and Terrorism Research, 
http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GlobalAnalysis/SpotReportOnChristmasDayAirlineBombPlot2009.pdf.  
39 James Jay Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman, “40 Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11:  Combating 
Complacency in the Long War on Terror,” Backgrounder, no. 2604 (September 7, 2011):  1.   
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THWARTED ATTACK DATE LEAD AGENCY 
assassination attempt and Firearms and local police 
Hamid Hayat June 2005 FBI 
Attack on L.A. National 
Guard facilities, 
synagogues and other 
targets 
August 2005 Not recorded 
Michael C. Reynolds December 2005 FBI 
Mohammed Zaki Amawi, 
Marwan Otherman El-
Hindi,  
and Zand Wassim 
Mazloum 
February 2006 Not recorded 
Syed Haris Ahmed and 
Ehsanul Islam Sadequee 
April 2006 Not recorded 
Sears Tower Plot June 2006 Not recorded 
Assem Hammoud (NYC 
and NJ underground transit 
links) 
July 2006 FBI 
Liquid Explosive Plot August 2006 British Law Enforcement 
Derrick Shareef (Chicago 
shopping mall) 
December 2006 FBI JTTF 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed March 2007 Captured in Pakistan 
Fort Dix Plot May 2007 FBI 
JFK Airport Plot June 2007 Not recorded 
Hassan Abujihaad March 2008 Not recorded 
Christopher Paul June 2008 Not recorded 
Synagogue Terror Plot May 2009 NYPD 
Najibulla Zazi September 2009 FBI 
Dallas skyscraper bombing 
plot 
September 2009 FBI 
Michael Finton September 2009 FBI 
Tarek Mehanna and 
Ahmad Abousamra 
October 2009 FBI 
Christmas Day Bomber December 2009 Passenger and crew 
Raja Lahrasib Khan March 2010 FBI JTTF 
Paul, Maria Rockwood and 
Nadia Piroska 
July 2010 FBI JTTF 
Farroque Ahmed October 2010 FBI 
Air Cargo Bomb Plot October 2010 Not recorded 
Portland Christmas Tree  
Lighting Plot 
November 2010 FBI 
Antonio Martinez December 2010 FBI 
Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari February 2011 FBI 
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THWARTED ATTACK DATE LEAD AGENCY 
Ahmed Ferhani and 
Mohamed Mamdouh 
May 2011 NYPD 
Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif 
and Walli Mujahidh 
June 2011 FBI 
Emerson Winfield Begolly August 2011 FBI 
 
C. THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ASPECT 
As DHS seeks to understand where and how it fits within the information-sharing 
network, it oftentimes ends up in unsettled waters with regards to civil liberties, in part 
because of its inexperience in the intelligence community.  The department continues to 
argue that it will “take very seriously our responsibility to protect the civil rights and 
liberties of the American people,” but its actions lead one to think otherwise.40  For 
example, in March 2008, the department’s intelligence office produced a “terrorism 
watch list” report highlighting American speakers who were scheduled to speak at a 
Muslim conference held in Georgia.  There was little information gathered on this event 
and none of the information led analysts to believe the participants were part of any 
extremist group or promoted an extremist ideology.  Despite not having credible 
information, the department added the speaker’s names to the terrorism watch list 
anyway, which could have resulted in an infringement on Americans’ First Amendment 
rights.41   
Some may say that violation of rights from time to time is the cost of keeping 
America safe, but the reality is that DHS is outside of its area of expertise.  This example 
does not represent especially surprising failures in the security-liberty balance; just about 
every agency in the IC has had its share of civil-liberties issues.  The point is, though, that 
these other agencies have already been through the “growing up” process on this count, 
while DHS seems to be slogging through the kinds of problems that gave rise to the last 
great wave of First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the 1970s.  If these new-old 
                                                 
40 Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, “Intelligence Improperly Collected on U.S. Citizens,” New York 
Times, December 16, 2009,  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/17/us/17disclose.html. 
41 Savage, “Intelligence Improperly Collected on U.S. Citizens,” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/17/us/17disclose.html. 
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missteps continue, it is likely to reduce what little faith and credibility it has as a leading 
intelligence agency against terrorism.  
D. WHY NOT THE FBI? 
 When it comes to gathering information in a domestic capacity, the FBI has 
always been the premiere organization to do so.  Its initial powers stemmed from a 
decision by the U.S. Attorney General in 1908 to create an organization that would be 
used to help his office gather information and prosecute crimes against the United 
States.42 Over the years, it has grown stronger and stronger, especially during the years 
that included the United States’ involvement in World War I.  The country passed varied 
legislation on Immigration (1917), Espionage (1917), Sedition (1918), and Anarchism 
(1918), acts that provided the FBI “legal authority to conduct domestic intelligence 
activities.”43 
With the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS was given a 
mandate:  
To review, analyze, and make recommendations for improvements in the 
policies and procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement 
information, intelligence information, intelligence-related information, and 
other information relating to homeland security within the Federal 
Government and between the Federal Government and State and local 
government agencies and authorities.44 
This mandate puts the organization squarely in the realm of affecting policy with 
regards to law enforcement information and other intelligence.  On the other hand, DHS’s 
creation did not include the one organization that, throughout its history, has been the 
elite force in national law enforcement and domestic intelligence—the FBI.  From the 
beginning, syncing of DHS and the FBI was never intended.  The lobby for the FBI was 
too strong and before the final decision was made to stand up DHS, the large intelligence 
bodies (DoD, FBI, and CIA) had positioned themselves to minimize the impact of a new 
                                                 
42 Brian A. Jackson, “The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society,” RAND Homeland 
Security Program and the Intelligence Policy Center (Arlington, VA, RAND Corporation:  2009). 16. 
43 Ibid., 18. 
44 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Sec 201, D-8. 
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bureaucracy.  Andy McCarthy sums up this point perfectly when he states, “the 
department’s entire purpose was moot before it was even born…the original idea behind 
DHS was to solve the Wall problem—impediments to intelligence sharing that were 
making the FBI, our domestic intelligence service, ineffective.”45  
In the event, the points of overlap and disconnection between DHS and the FBI 
pose their own in-built challenge to reconciling or streamlining the homeland intelligence 
function.  Representative Sue Myrick, subcommittee chairwoman on the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Human Intelligence (HUMINT), 
Analysis, and Counterterrorism noted in January 2012:  
There are key areas of overlap between the roles and responsibilities of 
DHS and other federal agencies, namely the FBI, including:  The 
prevention and disruption of terrorist threats to the United States, 
including through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
intelligence information and warnings on terrorist threats; and the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information regarding 
vulnerabilities and preparedness with respect to terrorism.46  
DHS was never intended to be a significant intelligence force multiplier.  Some 
have argued that the department was an “ill-conceived”47 attempt at creating a 
bureaucratic structure capable of being accountable and responsive to the protection of 
the homeland. If one of the goals of the administration was to provide the American 
people with a more robust solution, then the Federal Bureau of Investigation would have 
been the twenty-third organization added to the newly formed department.  The FBI is 
the nation’s primary domestic intelligence organization, with an established presence in 
the Intelligence Community.  With numerous reports proclaiming Sept. 11 was an 
                                                 
45 Tobin Harshaw, “The Homeland Secretary’s Job Security,” New York Times, January 1, 2010.  
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/the-homeland-secretarys-job-security/; Andrew C. 
McCarthy, “The ‘Fire Napolitano’ Debate,” National Review Online, December 30, 2009, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/192101/fire-napolitano-debate-andrew-c-mccarthy.  
46 The Role of DHS in the IC:  A Report By the Aspen Institute:  Hearing Before the United States 
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence.  112th Cong. (January 18, 2012) (statement of Sue Myrick, 
Subcommittee Chairwoman). 
47 David Rittgers, “Abolish the Department of Homeland Security,” Policy Analysis, No 683, 
(September 11, 2011), CATO Institute, 17, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=686964.  
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intelligence failure that involved the FBI and the CIA, it seems reasonable that DHS 
would have gained command and control over the FBI.48   
Each organization plays a role in combating terrorism.  The FBI is to “protect and 
defend…against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats,” and DHS is to “prevent” them 
from even occurring.49  In light of the perceived differences in mission, guidance in the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 empowered affected Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement agencies, not DHS, to investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism.50  Josh 
Filler contends that, “that clause, coupled with the FBI being kept out of DHS, has been a 
major factor in the division between DHS and the means to carry out its mission.51  
E. ARE FUSION CENTERS THE ANSWER?   
Without the FBI in its inventory, DHS is moving forward with establishing a 
networked relationship with fusion centers.  This connection to the fusion centers is ideal 
because they are designed to collect domestic information and ensure that important 
information is shared with other agencies that have a need to know.  There are seventy-
seven fusion centers today, one in every state and twenty-two more that are “secondary 
designated” fusion centers.52  These centers are owned and operated by the states and 
localities where they are located and are intended to meet the needs of the state 
government.53  There is an expectation that each of these centers will collaborate and 
maximize their joint capabilities to keep Americans safe. 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 5–6. 
49 Homeland Security Act 2002, PUBLIC LAW 107–296, 6 US Code (2002): Section 201(d), 1A, B, 
C. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=614; Josh Filler, “The Disconnect between DHS and the Homeland 




52 GAO, “Information Sharing:  DHS Could Better Define How it Plans to Meet its State and Local 
Mission and Improve Performance Accountability,” Homeland Security Digital Library, December 2010.  
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=12819.  19; Justin Lewis Abold, Ray Guidetti, and Doug Keyer, 
“Strengthening the Value of the National Network of Fusion Centers by Leveraging Specialization:  
Defining “Center of Analytical Excellence,” Homeland Security Affairs 8, no. 7 (June, 2012): 3,  
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.7.  
53 DHS OIG, “DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers is Evolving,” December 10, 2008,  
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-12_Dec08.pdf.   
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So where does DHS fit into this equation?  In Public Law 110-53, Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, DHS was directed to “establish 
a Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative 
to establish partnerships with State, local, regional fusion centers.”  Through this 
initiative DHS will “provide operational and intelligence advice and assistance to State, 
local, and regional fusion centers,” and “support efforts to include State, local, and 
regional fusion centers into efforts to establish an information sharing environment.”54 
As a result, DHS has implemented its Interaction with State and Local Fusion Center 
(SLFC) Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  This CONOP is designed to “establish DHS 
presence in SLFCs, enable the national fusion center network, operate, and sustain 
investment and activities.”55  DHS’s inability to break through the glass ceiling of the 
intelligence community and its relegation to a small intelligence role only raise more 
questions as to its utility in this regard.  
DHS is supposed to be the ultimate fusion center.  Establishing a link between the 
federal, state, local, tribal, and corporate partners is what DHS is chartered to do.  Having 
such a massive bureaucratic organization and not giving it the authority and resources 
necessary to succeed shows a lack of commitment, by American lawmakers, towards 
instituting change necessary for success.   When creating these centers, DHS was neither 
leading the effort nor were they consulted on how these resources should be organized.  It 
was only after the fact that DHS has tried to establish a link with fusion centers.  The 
department lacks the authority to direct actions so it has assumed the role of resourcing, 
personnel training, ensuring cooperation and coordination throughout the intelligence 
environment.56  If this is all that DHS is responsible for doing, there could be an 
argument that the department should hand this responsibility over to another agency that 
has more of a direct role in the day-to-day intelligence collecting and analysis mission.   
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F. STILL FLEDGLING IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
For nearly a decade, DHS continues to struggle to establish a strong intelligence 
security environment.  Although there have been many initiatives put forward, a recent 
two-year study of DHS’s progress in support of state and local fusion centers, published 
in October 2012 by the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
argued that the Department is neither meeting expectations nor is it improving its 
compliance with its federal mandates.57   
The report points out several relationship deficiencies between DHS and fusion 
centers.  Many of them are significant and further support the argument that DHS is out 
of its league in the Intelligence Community.  The report identified: 
•  DHS personnel assigned to fusion centers disseminated intelligence data 
that was of “uneven quality—oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes 
endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, 
occasionally taken already-published public sources, and more often than 
not unrelated to terrorism.”58 
• Involvement in improving the effectiveness of fusion centers was lacking.  
This included DHS’s lack of management and oversight of the centers’ 
counterterrorism intelligence reporting process and federal dollars 
provided to support operations59   
• Some fusion centers were identified as lacking “either the capability or 
stated objective of contributing meaningfully to the federal 
counterterrorism mission.  Additionally, “many didn’t consider 
counterterrorism an explicit part of their mission…some were simply not 
concerned with doing counterterrorism work.”60 
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Each of these shortcomings is damaging to the credibility of the department.  Not only 
does the Congress expect more but the American people deserve better, a sentiment 
echoed by Representative Coburn after his committee released the report.61   
Probably the most egregious offense is the lack of fiscal accountability.  Today, 
the United States nears a fiscal cliff where enormous spending cuts will take place in an 
effort to put the economy on a more fiscally responsible path. This fiscal cliff is rather 
steeper for DHS’s inability to account for and show where more than $1 billion in federal 
funds had been spent.  Through review of many documents, the committee identified that 
significant amounts of federal funds were spent on things not related to the fusion center 
mission.  Some examples provided included: 
• Thirty-three thousand dollars spent on a Chevy Tahoe by Arizona’s 
Department of Public Safety—which was money awarded to support 
Arizona’s Counter Terrorism Information Center.  One year later, an 
additional truck was purchased using the justification that the asset would 
serve as a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear response 
vehicle.  In the end, the asset was given to the Arizona State University 
Police Department and outfitted as a K-9 vehicle.62   
• Fifteen thousand dollars spent on ruggedized laptops to support the 
Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center which are utilized by the county 
medical examiner’s office.63 
• Eighty thousand dollars a month for two years, totaling $960,000, to 
support lease space of the Arizona’s Counter Terrorism Information 
Center.  This transaction seems allowable, however, the rules prohibit 
using these funds for Management and Administration—and leases and 
rent falls within this category.64  
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As one analyzes these examples it is obvious that DHS is failing at providing the 
expected oversight of fusion centers required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  
This failing, in turn, gives the appearance of an intelligence framework on the brink of 
collapse.  
G. CONCLUSION 
The intelligence apparatus following 9/11 has not experienced the necessary 
change it needs to be successful.  The creation of DHS through the collective binding of 
different parts of other federal agencies has only clouded the view of what actions should 
have been implemented after such a tragedy.  One of the missed opportunities was not 
including the FBI in this merger.  As the premiere domestic intelligence organization, it 
only seems plausible that lawmakers would have added this necessary capability to 
DHS’s toolbox.  Having quasi-intelligence functions such as CBP and ICE are valuable, 
but they are inexperienced in the ways of collecting and fusing intelligence.  Adding the 
FBI to the team would have linked all sources together for a more rapid interdiction 
across the nation. 
Because DHS lacks true intelligence capacity and capability, the first 
recommendation is to remove the organization, as a whole, from the domestic 
intelligence equations.  Its mission focus should be relegated to monitoring and securing 
the nation’s borders through CBP; monitoring and enforcing immigration laws through 
ICE; and protecting the flying public from unauthorized use of the airways by aggressive 
non-state actors.   
DHS, in many instances, is an impediment to successful intelligence work.  This 
has been shown in the recent report completed by the U.S. Senate.  This report shows that 
the link between DHS and fusion centers is fragile, almost non-existent with the 
exception of the federal funding provided.  The truth of the matter is that fusion centers 
are not the answer to DHS’s woes in the intelligence community.  The viability of fusion 
centers remains strong even if one removed the department from its lines of 
communication.  Additionally, DHS’s formulation of HSINT is unlikely to gain traction 
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in the IC because it is out of the ordinary. The function of HSINT will only become 
relevant when one of the nation’s major intelligence arms takes control of it.   
The second recommendation is to make the FBI the link between the members of 
the IC, state, local, tribal and corporate partners.  Since Sept. 11, the FBI has been the 
force behind disrupting terrorism plots such as the Brooklyn Bridge and Sears Tower 
attacks.  The Bureau is so engrained in the American psyche as a defender of justice that 
it only makes sense that it leads the homeland in collecting and analyzing massive 
amounts of data to foil the next big plot.  Its relationship and ties to the Department of 




III. A RENEWED FOCUS ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Before Sept. 11, FEMA was reeling from a mission change where it had to 
transition from preparing the nation for recovery from an all-out nuclear war to a new 
five-prong mandate:   
• To improve state and local response and recovery capabilities  
• To coordinate with other support providing federal agencies  
• To provide federal aid to affected citizens  
• Issue grants to affected state and local municipalities  
• Be the lead agency for ‘grants, flood plain mitigation’ and other mitigation 
factors65  
This five-prong mandate was implemented by James Witt.  He was committed to 
reshaping the image of the organization and placing it on a path to long-lasting success.  
Unfortunately, FEMA’s merger with DHS following the Sept. 11 attacks created 
roadblocks and detours that hindered the organization from maintaining its focus on 
improving state, local, tribal government’s emergency management capabilities.  For 
example in 2004 Secretary Ridge “removed numerous preparedness grant programs from 
FEMA and placed them in another office inside DHS.”66  Additionally, Secretary 
Chertoff, in 2005, stripped FEMA of any remaining preparedness programs.67   Without 
the management oversight of the preparedness grant programs, FEMA lost its ability to 
provide support in times of crisis.  This weakness was evident during its response during 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.      
The preponderance of FEMA’s failures, both before and after the agency joined 
DHS, involved the lack of effective communication between FEMA and state and local 
emergency management offices.  Additionally, the agency is continually beset with 
leaders who lack a background in emergency management who unintentionally create an 
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environment where lessons learned must always be relearned.  These shortcomings are 
compounded even more now with FEMA in DHS.  As a consequence of this merger, the 
agency’s core principles have been reshaped to meet other priorities.  FEMA’s response 
to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that its ability to respond in a timely manner with 
food, shelter, clothing, and financial assistance has been eroded by the new bureaucracy.  
Some are calling for FEMA to return to the basics of emergency management and leave 
homeland security to more clearly specialized agencies.68  
A. THE RISE OF FEMA  
Before 1950, emergency management’s national identity consisted of an ad-hoc 
approach to response and recovery because national priorities were centered on keeping 
the world safe from a potential nuclear holocaust during the Cold War era.69    In 1950, 
Congress passed legislation aimed at streamlining the federal response—the Disaster 
Relief Act.  This law empowered federal agencies to respond in a timelier manner and 
provide disaster assistance to states and their municipalities in the wake of a major 
disaster.70   
For nearly 30 years following the passage of the Disaster Relief Act, emergency 
management oversight transitioned from one federal agency to another.  The 1950 Act 
placed responsibility on senior leaders to determine when federal assistance was needed.  
State governors were required to request assistance, and the President had to make a 
federal declaration making available federal personnel, expertise, equipment, and 
funding.  But constant shifts in oversight and renewed focus on providing required 
assistance, the nation’s emergency management bureaucracy still operated as if it was 
paralyzed—each level of government—the states and federal government—waited for 
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the other to make the first move.  Eventually, miscues such as the botched response to the 
Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant accident in March 1979 were more 
than the Executive could bear.71  As a consequence, on July 20, 1979, President Jimmy 
Carter used his executive power and issued Executive Order 12148 thereby forming the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. 72   
The agency’s primary responsibility, at conception, was to take on the nation’s 
civil-defense mission that focused on ensuring that the United States could survive and 
recover from a nuclear attack.  In addition to its responsibility for civil defense, FEMA 
had to focus on natural disaster response and recovery operations with a mandate to 
establish and strengthen communications with state and local emergency management 
agencies. 73  But as a Department of Homeland Security Inspector General (IG) Report 
noted, even after the creation of FEMA, emergency management operations were still 
disconnected and “struggled to become a cohesive, effective organization.”74   
B. A WAKE-UP CALL FOR THE AGENCY 
What started out as a calm day in Florida’s Dade County quickly turned into a 
frightful event that the state would never forget.  Tropical Storm Andrew, which formed 
off the coast of West Africa, moved through the Atlantic Ocean with an eye focused on 
the southern Florida coastline. On its trip, Tropical Storm Andrew’s force teetered back 
and forth and nearly subsided before reaching Bermuda and Puerto Rico.  Unfortunately 
for residents in South Dade County, the storm encountered favorable weather conditions 
that quickly intensified the storm to Category 4 status.  Andrew first reached landfall on 
August 23, 1992, near Homestead, Florida, where the National Hurricane Center reported 
“142 miles per hour sustained winds and 169 miles per hour gust” with an initial 
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seventeen-foot storm surge wall at the landfall point.  The sustained winds and gust alone 
made it the third-most intense hurricane on record to ever hit the United States.75  
Andrew quickly pushed through to South Dade County, which many survivors 
claimed was not an area expected to feel the full force of the storm.  Therefore, most of 
South Dade County’s 415,000 residents remained in their homes, expecting the storm to 
pass by with the force of the storm being absorbed by Miami.  Through the course of the 
storm’s travels, there existed a limited capability of the National Hurricane Center to 
effectively predict the storm’s path.  Reports across the Florida peninsula warned 
residents of Miami to begin evacuations and implement emergency management shelter, 
response, and recovery plans.  A shift of a mere five degrees south from the original 
course placed South Dade County in the center of the storm’s bulls-eye, with local 
notifications and the powerful storm strike only minutes apart.76  
The lack of notification was a major hindrance to emergency planning in South 
Dade.  As the storm raged over the Bahamas at the Category 4 level, many of Florida’s 
residents were expecting the storm to take a different path. There is at least one report 
that declared the storm was miscalculated by weather personnel.  In the story of Harold 
Keith, a survivor of the storm, it accounts that the National Hurricane Bureau was well 
aware of the Hurricane’s track but chose to shelter only residents of Palm Beach and 
Miami due to limited shelters.77     
Hurricane Andrew was the third-costliest hurricane in American history.  It 
caused more than $26 billion in damage, but surprisingly, only 23 directly related 
deaths.78  Additionally, 250,000 of the county’s 415,000 residents were reported as 
homeless79 and a staggering 126,000 homes destroyed.80 
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In the aftermath of the hurricane, the wind and rain torn municipalities in South 
Dade waited for help and assistance from any and every one.  The likely source of 
recovery following something this devastating had to originate from the outside, 
preferably the federal agency created specifically for this purpose—FEMA. Andrew 
served as an eye-opener for FEMA.  During this time of crisis, limitations in 
communication between federal, state, and local emergency management agencies were 
highlighted.  Over the course of 72 hours, FEMA was nowhere to be found.81  Although 
Florida had submitted a request for federal assistance through normal channels, Dade 
County emergency manager, Kate Hale, was flabbergasted at the lack of federal support 
received in the early efforts of recovery.  She cried out, “Where the hell is the cavalry on 
this one?  We need food! We need water! We need people!  If we do not get more food 
into the south end (South Dade) in a very short period of time, we are going to have more 
casualties.”82  
The agency was required to act only after receiving a Presidential federal 
emergency declaration, which, in turn, had to be prompted by a request from state 
officials.  This significantly hampered the agency’s ability to be proactive and respond to 
the wind torn region of South Florida. The slow response diminished the trust in the 
organization created to provide relief and comfort during national emergencies such as 
this.  As a result of these failures, senior leaders took action and decided that changes 
needed to be made.83      
C. FEMA GOES TO CONGRESS 
The biggest critic of FEMA is the U.S. Congress. Congress took FEMA to task 
following the less-than-stellar response by the agency in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Andrew. Congress commissioned two studies of FEMA, one by the U.S. General 
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Accounting Office (GAO) and one by the National Academy of Public Administration 
(NAPA) in 1993.  Both reports put the agency under a very critical light, asking whether 
FEMA should be dismantled; what type of relationship the agency should have with the 
U.S. military; ways to improve the relationship between the agency and civil defense as 
they respond to a nuclear incident; general areas for improvement; a need for a 
streamlined working relationship with state and local emergency elements; and the need 
to bolster interaction with both the executive and legislative branches.84  
Of the two commissioned studies, NAPA’s Coping with Catastrophe provided the 
most insightful recommendations to the Congressional committees.  The study did not 
advocate for the outright abolition of FEMA because NAPA determined a need existed 
for a federal entity to manage recovery and response operations during periods of 
national crisis.  In the aftermath of Andrew, the military bore the brunt of the recovery 
efforts because FEMA’s actions were not well coordinated to meet the need.  This 
opened a debate as to whether the military was better suited to handle domestic relief 
efforts and whether the agency should be restructured and placed under the Department 
of Defense.  NAPA’s study concluded “that core domestic emergency management 
operations should not be transferred to the military and that the military should assume a 
supplemental disaster relief role.”85 
The reports were also clear that the relationship between FEMA and Congress 
required improvement.  One of the recommendations was for Congress to develop “a 
clear legislative charter”86 that would reduce the number of committees providing 
oversight of the organization.  This streamlined approach to oversight would allow the 
agency the flexibility it needed to amass capabilities and allow Congressional personnel 
to focus on providing the agency the tools it needed to be successful.87  Congress took 
another bold step when it passed the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (Stafford Act), an amended extension of the Federal Disaster Relief Act 
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of 1950, giving the President more latitude to use federal resources in response to 
domestic emergencies. The Stafford Act also empowered the president to use military 
personnel and equipment whenever necessary to support a state declared emergency or 
major disaster. The Stafford Act further clarified the process by which governors or the 
state appointed representative must work with FEMA to request federal assistance.  It 
established timelines for requests to be submitted and identified cost-sharing levels of 
support.  Under these cost-sharing measures, the federal government is responsible for no 
less than seventy-five percent and the non-federal funds provided to states are usually in 
the form of interest-bearing loans from the Small Business Association. 88 
D. A NEW BEGINNING 
Restructuring of FEMA seemed to be the only logical solution to remedy some of 
the challenges it constantly faced when dealing with state and local offices.  The primary 
limitation was the lack of understanding by local and state agencies of how to request 
assistance either before the incident occurs or in the aftermath.  One of FEMA’s core 
tenets is to ensure state agencies understand how to communicate their needs so they are 
able to get the assistance required in a timely manner.89 
In the wake of Andrew and the reports to Congress, James Lee Witt was 
appointed FEMA director by President Bill Clinton in 1993.  Mr. Witt was the first 
qualified emergency management professional to lead the agency.  His emergency 
management background included being appointed the director of Arkansas’ Office of 
Emergency Services (OES) and serving in this post from 1988–1992.  While serving as 
director of OES, he oversaw the merger of the state’s Fire Protection Services Program 
which included its board and grant programs.90  He replaced Wallace E. Stickney, an 
engineer, career government employee, and director during the failed response to 
Hurricane Andrew, and acting director William C. Tidball, also a career government 
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employee; neither had any previous emergency management experience.  Mr. Witt’s first 
order of business was to motivate the organization to improve its response and recovery 
capabilities to man-made or natural disasters.  Mr. Witt described his plan during a 
Senate confirmation hearing in which he pledged to “develop a partnership, a new 
partnership, wherein the Congress, the White House, Federal agencies, state and local 
emergency management agencies, and private organizations are partners in planning and 
executing the emergency management program.”91   
This declaration was what the agency needed to repair the internal shortcomings 
realized by the growing reduction in morale.  Witt’s also committed to bridging the gaps 
between the federal, state, local, tribal, and private agencies with a streamlined focus on 
mitigation, preparation, response and recovery during and natural disaster events.  In 
addition to the renewed focus on emergency management practices, he was able to 
establish a direct relationship with the president because the FEMA director was now a 
Cabinet-level position—giving him and his staff unimpeded access for immediate 
decision making during times of crisis. 
E. FEMA AFTER 9/11 
FEMA seemed better prepared to respond following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.  
There were three procedural changes that made the difference:   
First, FEMA did not require state or local governments to provide a share 
of federally provided disaster response and recovery costs.  The second 
distinct aspect of FEMA’s public assistance to New York was that there 
was a funding target that became a cap on the level of the assistance. 
Third, the size and type of work funded were quite different from the 
public assistance provided after prior major natural disasters.92  
Each of these changes removed a significant hindrance that had impeded FEMA’s ability 
to respond during Hurricane Andrew.  Removing these administrative roadblocks opened 
up communication lanes and allowed disaster assistance to occur quickly.  Hence, 
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approximately $8.8 billion in public assistance in the form of “grants to state and local 
governments for emergency response, such as debris removal, and permanent work, such 
as the repair of disaster damaged public facilities”93 was issued, making it the largest aid 
package ever rendered by the agency.94 Although there were still oversight and funds 
management problems uncovered by the GAO following the response, the changes 
implemented under Witt, opened the gateway for FEMA to meet executive and 
legislative mandates for providing support to those in need following the terrorist attacks.  
F. MESSING WITH SUCCESS 
Following the events on Sept. 11, President Bush directed the establishment of 
DHS in an effort to consolidate resources and streamline intergovernmental agency 
interaction designed to prevent future terrorist attacks.  FEMA would be absorbed by the 
department because of its earlier role in civil defense.   Now the agency added detection 
and prevention of weapons of mass destruction to an already long to do list.  Although 
FEMA has always been viewed as “a president-serving and president-dependent 
agency,”95 this organizational realignment was the end of the agency’s autonomy and its 
direct link to the President was dissolved.  
The loss of FEMA’s autonomy and presidential backing was only one of the 
organization’s setbacks.  FEMA, as a member of DHS, must also compete with 21 other 
federal agencies for departmental funding.  In addition, the lines of communication 
between federal and state emergency management office are even more diluted as an 
additional layer of bureaucracy is added.  Local emergency managers, who need to 
understand how the system works, expressed concern that they are unaware of whom to 
communicate their requirements to.  This point was made by Russ Decker, an Ohio 
emergency management director, when he expressed his frustration with the new 
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organizational setup by asking, “Are we supposed to talk to the DHS guy? Are we 
supposed to talk to the FEMA guy? Who are we supposed to be talking to to get help?”96   
President Bush’s appointment of Joseph Allbaugh as the FEMA Director to 
replace James Witt heralded a new era for emergency management in the United States.  
Mr. Allbaugh, unlike James Witt, had zero emergency management experience.  Prior to 
his appointment, he worked as one of President Bush’s campaign managers.  
Additionally, DHS was creating a staff filled with young, new, and energetic personnel 
whose main focus, as one of the staffers put it, was to “detect and defeat terrorism so 
there would be no need for response and recovery.”97  There was a level of uncertainty 
now that FEMA’s core mission is overshadowed by terrorism.  This level of uncertainty 
is sure to bring back remnants of old FEMA, an organization unable to provide lifesaving 
and sustaining support to American citizen after a disaster.98 
G. THE TEST 
Nearly four years after the attacks on New York and the Pentagon, the 
administration would be given a chance to prove that its decision to create DHS and place 
FEMA under its command and control was indeed the right decision for the nation.  On 
August 29, 2005, another devastating storm struck the Gulf Coast of the United States. 
The areas hit hardest were New Orleans, Louisiana, and the Gulf Coast of Mississippi, 
where the cost rose into the billions.  Ultimately, Hurricane Katrina caused some three 
times the devastation of Hurricane Andrew.99   
Tropical Storm Katrina formed while moving through the Bahamas on August 24, 
2005.  The storm became a Category one storm two hours before it made landfall in 
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South Florida.  Katrina pushed through the southern tip of Florida and intensified once it 
hit the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico.  As the storm plowed through the Gulf on 
August 26, it quickly became a Category two hurricane.  Over the course of 48 hours, the 
storm’s central pressure dropped considerably causing sustained winds to increase from 
“95 mph to an estimated 175 mph…making Katrina a Category 5.”100 On August 29, in 
the early hours of the morning, Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the southeastern 
coast of Louisiana as a Category 4 storm with the potential of storm surges upwards of 20 
to 25 feet.  Nearly three hours after making the initial landfall, Hurricane Katrina 
pummeled New Orleans with sustained winds of 145 mph and 15 foot storm surges.  
Katrina and all it fury caused three of New Orleans’ levees to breach, causing much of 
the city, which already sits below sea level, to experience massive flooding. The effects 
of the flooding were hard to overcome because of the failure of the levee pumps and the 
overwhelming number of citizens and tourists, estimated to be 100,000, who still 
remained in the city.  The death toll from the storm totaled an approximate 1,200 people 
while tens of thousands more were displaced. 
Many who were unable to leave took refuge in the Louisiana Superdome.  There 
were many sick, elderly, and bed-ridden people in hospitals and nursing homes who 
suffered a horrific fate as staff members chose not to evacuate patients due to either the 
lack of capability or the means to acquire it.  This was the case at the St. Rita’s nursing 
home, where 40 of the 60 residents died as a result of the floodwaters overtaking the 
facility.  The owners of this facility were later convicted of negligence for refusing to 
follow a mandatory evacuation mandate, contributing to the untimely death of its 
residents.101 
Katrina offered FEMA another opportunity to prove how important it was to the 
country.  In the Witt years, the agency appeared to have recovered from the internal and 
organizational problems it experienced before, during, and following Hurricane Andrew.  
FEMA’s performance leading up to and following the Gulf Coast storm reminded many 
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of the failed response that occurred in Florida in 1992.102  During the response to 
Katrina, FEMA was slow to move critical supplies such as ice and water to affected 
areas.  Additionally, FEMA failed to review the lessons learned from the previous year’s 
simulation exercise, Hurricane Pam, which addressed many of the issues the 
organization experienced in the aftermath of Katrina.103   
Some of those lessons learned from that earlier exercise involved the need for 
additional landfills to store debris, and a need for additional shelters, staffing, and a plan 
to replenish them.  Also, transportation plans were developed to address the movement of 
stranded residents from the affected area as well as the transport of patients and the 
resupply of hospitals.104  Every issue identified during the Pam exercise came to fruition.  
In the aftermath of Katrina, 100 million cubic yards of debris needed to be removed and 
two years after the event, more funding was still needed to support the cleanup effort105; 
thousands of people were displaced and housed in the Superdome as a make-shift shelter; 
and residents waited for days to be rescued from the flood stricken areas while many of 
the local hospitals and nursing homes, like St. Rita, were unable to relocate its patients 
due to limited numbers of helicopters and busses to support the plan.106 
Questions begin to arise as to how an organization could completely fail to do its 
job.  Consistent failures of the organization resurfaced discussions of whether the agency 
needed to remain within DHS.107  FEMA seemed to have reverted to its pre-9/11 state 
which, as with the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, led to renewed Congressional scrutiny 
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and prompted the legislative branch to pass the 2006 Post Katrina Emergency Reform 
Act.108 This piece of legislation, led by Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman, 
would revise the current Stafford Act and set in place provisions to:  
Reform and reorganize national preparedness and response; make staffing 
improvements to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency; improve disaster planning, 
including the evacuation of people with disabilities and other vulnerable 
populations; improve preparedness and training; and implement new 
measures to prevent fraud, waste and abuse during emergencies.109  
H. WHAT IS WRONG WITH FEMA? 
Under the leadership of James Witt, FEMA lost the stigma of an incompetent and 
incapable federal agency.110  So what went wrong during Katrina?  The simple answer is 
that it was the lack of effective, professional leadership.  This was noted in a “Special 
Report,” conducted in 2006 by the Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs; where Michael Brown, FEMA director during the response to 
Katrina, was criticized for lacking “the leadership skills that were needed” 111 to lead the 
agency.  Additionally, DHS Secretary at the time, Michael Chertoff, was also cited for 
lacking leadership, which contributed to the failed response.  The report stated:  
More broadly, DHS – as the Department charged with preparing for and 
responding to domestic incidents, whether terrorist attacks or natural 
disasters – failed to effectively lead the federal response to Hurricane 
Katrina. DHS leadership failed to bring a sense of urgency to the federal 
government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and Secretary Chertoff 
himself should have been more engaged in preparations over the weekend 
before landfall.112 
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Former Director James Witt commented on the Katrina response to a reporter 
from Knight-Ridder news in August 2005, essentially highlighting FEMA 
unpreparedness.  He stated, “These things need to be planned and prepared for; and it just 
doesn’t look like it was.” 113  
There have also been claims that the funding programmed, planned, and budgeted 
by FEMA continues to be redirected to meet other priorities within DHS.114  Former 
FEMA Administrator Brown noted in his testimony before the Select Committee that 
funding after moving to DHS became contentious.  The organization continued to 
experience budget cuts despite Brown’s call for a funding to support catastrophic disaster 
planning.  He recounts being told in 2005 by DHS’s Under Secretary for Management, 
Janet Hale, to not request this funding because “you are not going to get it.”  She further 
explained that if Administrator Brown would push back and submit anyway he would be 
viewed as not being a “team player.”115  
I. FIXING THE FEMA PROBLEM 
The federal agency with lead responsibility for responding to national 
disasters -- FEMA -- has lost its way since it was transferred to the 
Department of Homeland Security. This is simply not the same agency 
that responded so effectively to the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.   
     — Congressman Sandy Levin116 
The big problem with FEMA, as outlined by Congressman Sandy Levin, is the 
loss of identity now that it is part of DHS.  Leaders within the executive and legislative 
branch must assist in establishing the identity of the agency they lean so heavily on 
during times of crises.  In many cases this has been done through the Stafford and Post 
Katrina acts which have expanded and clarified roles and responsibilities for emergency 
                                                 
113 Borenstein, “Federal Government Wasn’t Ready.”  
114 “Special Report,” 216–217. 
115 House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation For and 
Response To Hurricane Katrina, “Deposition—FEMA Director Michael Brown,” Homeland Security 
Digital Library. Accessed September 10, 2012,  https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=467790, 43–44.  
116 “Providing For Consideration of the Second Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet 




management.  There exists a huge debate as to whether FEMA and DHS should continue 
its marriage in hopes that the results will mirror those of the U.S. military as a result of 
the Gold-Waters Nichols Act.  This act’s purpose was to design a culture of jointness 
among the Services, in order to improve coordination, communication, and cooperation 
in peacetime and wartime.117   
There are many who view the merger a positive sign for the future.   Scholars like 
Jenna McNeil of the Heritage Foundation proposed five reasons that FEMA should 
remain part of DHS.  The first reason is that despite the call for separating the two 
organizations, it will not make the U.S. safer.  She argues that removing FEMA will not 
protect the nation from “acts of terror or natural disaster.”118  Doing so would inhibit 
cooperation and coordination with other federal entities like TSA and the Coast Guard 
who play a role in responding to disasters.  Second, constant restructuring will hamper 
the organization to capitalize on the gains it has made.  Third, removing FEMA would 
minimize the involvement of the federal government.  Fourth, senior leaders are 
confident that the necessary oversight of disaster operations will be taken care of by the 
Secretary of DHS.  Finally, she believes that the current organization structure is 
working. Each of these reasons appears to be sound, but they continue to run into 
resistance.119  Those on the opposite aisle, like Senator Levin, constantly call for 
separating FEMA from DHS; other former agency employees are just as passionate.  For 
example, Andrew Sachs, a former FEMA employee before the merger, said: 
 The agency has to have the flexibility to make decisions on the fly on the 
ground within the broad authorities that it has.  Now there is no decision 
that can't be made without it having to go back to Washington, D.C., and 
that causes problems when you're dealing with a disaster time frame and a 
disaster context.120   
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Former Administrator Michael Brown also spoke out against the merger despite 
being named the first Administrator under DHS.  He expressed that adding FEMA to 
DHS’s organizational structure would “fundamentally sever FEMA from its core 
function,” “shatter agency morale,” and “break long standing, effective and tested 
relationships with states and first responder stakeholders.”121   
J. CONCLUSION 
It is important for the American people to have complete trust and confidence in 
its government to assist during times of overwhelming destruction and despair that results 
from man-made or natural disasters. Today, FEMA is part of the Department of 
Homeland Security as a direct result of the September 11 terrorist attacks.  This shift in 
organizational culture has muddied the waters for the organization as it searches to 
understand which role it should focus on, terrorism or natural disasters, while also 
competing for funding against more than twenty additional agencies.  Additionally, the 
organization in the past has consistently been plagued with ill-trained and ineffective 
leadership which was the crux of it failures prior to Hurricane Katrina.  President 
Clinton’s appointment of James Witt, a seasoned emergency management specialist, as 
his FEMA director showed the importance of having qualified leadership in the 
organization.  FEMA refocused itself and started to show the American people that it was 
capable of accomplishing its federal mandate.  Not only was it able to perform, but the 
organization had direct access to the Executive.  Following 9/11, this direct access was 
severed as FEMA lost its autonomy and placed inside of DHS.  Problems that resulted 
from this realignment were realized during the response and recovery efforts to Hurricane 
Katrina.  The sitting Administrator was not qualified therefore he was unable to lead the 
organization in the aftermath of the storm. It quickly became evident that FEMA had 
returned to the FEMA of old.  
DHS was created as a response to terrorism not to combat hurricanes, tornadoes, 
wildfires, and earthquakes; therefore, FEMA has no place within the organization.  When 
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extreme natural disaster events happen and requires a federal response, no one is looking 
for DHS; everyone is looking for answers from FEMA and the President of the United 
States.  FEMA is an American staple and needs to be resurrected to a stand-alone agency 








This thesis set out to answer the question of whether the Department of Homeland 
Security has outlived its usefulness. Additional questions that the thesis set out to answer 
included: how effective is the department and should it be abolished, why was not the 
FBI included in the merger which created DHS, how well has DHS performed its 
intelligence mission, and should FEMA remain part of DHS.  The framework used to 
reach a conclusion was an analysis of two of DHS’s most important functions—
intelligence and emergency management.  The assumption was that reviewing these 
functions would either justify DHS’s creation or prove that it is no longer necessary and 
should be restructured, at best, or abolished.   
Chapter I of this thesis recognized that this study would not be all-inclusive, 
meaning that there are other DHS agencies, specifically Customs and Border Protection, 
Transportation Security Agency, Secret Service, or the Coast Guard, that could be studied 
in order to arrive at an absolute conclusion regarding whether DHS has outlived its 
usefulness.  Yet, it highlighted some of the problems that stem from DHS’s creation, 
which included how the organization was formed.  Essentially, it was a rapid and ad-hoc 
commingling of 22 different federal agencies, with different tasks and organizational 
structures, which were now expected to join forces to prevent terrorism in the United 
States.   
There was very little commonality in what these agencies did day to day before 
joining DHS and there is still some apprehension that after establishing DHS, many of 
the functions still don’t fit—for example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  
Another problem was that each of these new functions added to its task list a new mission 
that involved combating terrorism. The thesis notes that the formation of DHS was the 
largest bureaucratic transformation since the creation of the Department of Defense in 
1947.  Even in establishing DoD, though, the different military services had a common 
bond, which was to fight the nation’s wars.  This common bond did not exist for of the 
several agencies newly assigned to DHS in 2002.  The lack of a common bond, as this 
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thesis explored, affected the effectiveness of DHS inside of the intelligence community 
as well as the role it played in emergency management. 
In Chapter II, this thesis addressed the role of DHS within the IC.  It was noted 
that by law, DHS was expected pull information from the various members of the IC, 
perform an analysis, and provide recommendations on how to prevent the next big attack 
inside the homeland. It was determined that shortly after the signing of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, DHS’s task to assimilate information was removed when the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was established.  This was the first of 
many roadblocks for the organization.  Another roadblock was the missed opportunity to 
add the Federal Bureau of Investigation to DHS’s organizational structure.  What was lost 
was the credibility the department would have gained from having an existing member of 
the IC with a history of preventing, investigating, and protecting against extreme events, 
such as terrorism, on its team.  This would have given the organization instant legitimacy 
among the other intelligence agencies when dealing with domestic intelligence.   
Chapter II also focused on the events surrounding the underwear bomber plot, 
which occurred on December 25, 2009.  It looked at missed opportunities and failures 
across the board to include one of DHS’s agencies, the Transportation Security Agency.  
What was found is that information was collected by different agencies within the IC.  
Some of the information was shared and some was not, so the nation nearly repeated the 
9/11 event because implemented fixes to the system did not work.  It was realized that 
failure in this regard was not solely DHS’s fault, but the quick admission by DHS’s 
Secretary Napolitano that “the system worked,” promoted a closer look at the department 
and the role it plays in the intelligence arena.  The results of this closer look revealed that 
of the 40 reported terrorist plots attempted and thwarted since 9/11, it is unclear that DHS 
has had anything to do with preventing them.  What was determined is that the FBI is not 
only protecting the homeland but it is also preventing terrorism—which is a task given to 
DHS to perform.   
Despite DHS’s inability to be a leader in the intelligence community, it was given 
another opportunity to excel.  In 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act was signed into law, which tasked DHS to implement a fusion center 
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initiative that would link Federal, State, and local fusion centers to improve the 
information sharing between these levels of government.  The question here was: would 
fusion centers be the answer to DHS’s intelligence woes?  What was determined was that 
the relationship between fusion centers and DHS is one based purely on the federal 
dollars the department provides.  DHS does not exercise any oversight of the centers.  In 
fact, these centers are state run and operated with no jurisdictional or operational ties to 
the federal government.  The relationship between fusion centers and DHS has been a 
fledgling one.  There are very few examples of any success that can be derived from their 
relationship.  A 2012 report, completed by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigation, reveals many ongoing problems that exist between DHS and fusion 
centers.  Some of these problems are: DHS personnel assigned to fusion centers are 
unqualified and provide poor quality assessments that oftentimes border on violations of 
civil liberties; DHS still does not exert oversight and management of what information 
fusion centers gather and how the information is used; and despite the millions of federal 
dollars invested in these centers, many of them are not capable of providing quality 
assessments and many of them do not feel that counterterrorism is what they are 
supposed to do.  This report shows that DHS is still failing to function well in the IC.  It 
alludes to the fact that maybe DHS should just give up this role and focus on other areas 
that it may be able to do well. 
In Chapter III, the thesis looks at the opposite end of the spectrum by evaluating 
FEMA.  FEMA was one of those outlier agencies that had neither ties to combating 
terrorism nor anything to do with any law enforcement activities.  Yet, it was pushed into 
the organization anyway.  FEMA’s mission has evolved throughout its existence but 
through this evolution it has not experienced anything as radical as being added to DHS.  
A review of Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina offered insight to the performance of the 
agency before and after it became a member of the department.  What was noted was that 
in both instances, FEMA’s response was viewed as inadequate and in need of much 
improvement.  Additionally, the leadership of the organization at the time was ridiculed 
because those in charge lacked emergency management expertise, which many cited as 
the real problem for its failures.  Before Katrina, many of these shortfalls were remedied, 
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and FEMA had regained a respectable status as an agency capable of preparing the nation 
to respond to all-hazards. This resurgence was led by James Lee Witt, the only 
experienced emergency management director in FEMA’s history at the time.  This 
chapter notes that adding FEMA to the new homeland security organizational chart 
returned the agency to its inefficiencies of the past.  In essence, the success gained was 
suddenly washed away with the stroke of the presidential pen.  FEMA was no longer a 
Cabinet level agency with direct access to the president, but it was buried with the other 
21 agencies, inside DHS with a new focus on preventing terrorism.  The most egregious 
offense was the redistribution of its budget to support other agencies in preventing 
terrorism.  This shift in mission, inadequate leadership, along with a disparaging budget 
was the catalyst to DHS’s failed response during Hurricane Katrina. 
In order to ensure the nation does not have another situation like Hurricane 
Katrina, it is imperative for lawmakers to assess whether leaving FEMA in DHS is right 
for the nation.  History has shown that with the right leadership and proper resourcing, 
FEMA will perform emergency management task regardless of where it sits.  But, the 
agency is seen to work much better when it has direct access to the ultimate decision 
maker, the president, to ensure a rapid and impactful response.   
This thesis concludes that based on DHS’s irrelevance in the intelligence 
community and the fact that FEMA would better serve the public as a stand-alone agency 
again, DHS has outlived its usefulness.   
A. WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT? 
This thesis offers three recommendations:   
1. RECOMMENDATION 1:  REMOVE DHS FROM THE IC 
This recommendation is reasonable, considering the historical failures that have 
plagued the department with regards to intelligence.  It is not that the department has not 
received numerous opportunities to be successful.  It is mystifying, however, that a 
department has been created to prevent terrorism and yet lacks the capability to collect 
intelligence, arguably the key preventive function.  DHS exercises no control over any 
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agency in the IC.  If it is simply waiting to use analysis that has already been 
accomplished by others, then what purpose does it really serve?  Removing DHS would 
streamline the process because the system would no longer have a middleman in search 
of a role.  Lawmakers have to accept that adding an additional layer of bureaucracy was 
not the answer to the intelligence failure of September 11.  All that has been 
accomplished is the muddying of the proverbial waters to the point where questions of 
who does what, when, where, and how is even harder to answer. 
2. RECOMMENDATION 2:  MAKE THE FBI THE LINK BETWEEN 
FUSION CENTERS AND THE IC 
Domestic terrorism is a matter best handled by domestic law enforcement.  This 
thesis discovered that the FBI has been instrumental in thwarting nearly 40 attacks since 
9/11.  Instead of just protecting and defending against terrorist and foreign threats, it has 
taken on the role that DHS was to fill, namely preventing attacks from occurring.  The 
Bureau is only doing what it should have been charged to do following 9/11.  The FBI 
has implemented procedures to prevent crimes why not empower the organization to 
implement procedures to prevent terrorism.  Those existing relationships between the FBI 
and state and local law enforcement would have quickly enabled a link with fusion 
centers, making them relevant in the fight against terrorism.  Making it the leader in 
collecting and fusing domestic intelligence will bring a level of legitimacy to homeland 
security intelligence and improve the relationship between the federal government and 
state level fusion centers.  Additionally, building on this existing institution reduces the 
number of oversight committees needed to monitor domestic intelligence activities.  It 
also limits the stranglehold that lawmakers have as they look for ways to flex their 
legislative muscle and use homeland security as a political football enroute to a reelection 
bid.   
3. RECOMMENDATION 3:  MAKE FEMA A STAND-ALONE 
AGENCY AGAIN 
Throughout FEMA’s history, it has operated with full autonomy with direct links 
to the President.  But adding it to DHS severed that relationship and made the 
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organization less effective.  Hurricane Katrina was not an anomaly; it bordered on 
dereliction of duty.  But complete fault is not absorbed by FEMA because it was no 
longer in charge of its own fate.  Placing FEMA in DHS created a wall between it and the 
president; therefore, quick and decisive decision became a distant memory as the agency 
now had to wait for the order to come down through its new chain of command.   
Arguments for reestablishing FEMA as a stand-alone agency are strong, and a 
more recent storm—Superstorm Sandy, which slammed into the American northeast in 
October 2012—shows the importance of FEMA receiving direct orders from the 
president. FEMA’s response thus far has been viewed as “outstanding” by New Jersey 
Governor Chris Christie.122 FEMA is still under DHS, but the difference so far is the 
experienced leadership FEMA has in Administrator Craig Fugate and direct involvement 
from President Obama.  During a visit to FEMA headquarters prior to the storm making 
landfall, the President directed FEMA and other applicable federal agencies to find a way 
around the bureaucracy and red tape and find ways “to get to yes as opposed to no.”123  
These statements were directed to FEMA, and not FEMA’s boss on paper, the DHS 
Secretary.  This experience shows that a direct link is needed between FEMA and the 
president.   
The bottom line is that DHS was created as a response to terrorism, not to combat 
hurricanes, tornadoes, wildfires, and earthquakes; therefore FEMA has no place within 
the organization.  When extreme natural disaster events occur and require a federal 
response, no one is looking for DHS; everyone is looking for answers from FEMA and 
the President of the United States—just ask the folks who were impacted by Hurricane 
Katrina. 
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B. ARE THESE CHANGES POSSIBLE? 
For the foreseeable future, the pressure is likely to continue for DHS to be 
reformed or reorganized.  For example, the chairman of the House Homeland Security 
Oversight, Investigations, and Management Subcommittee has recently called for “an 
independent, top-to-bottom examination of deficiencies in Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) leadership and management structure.”124  But can it be reformed?  With 
every recommendation presented to solve a problem there are numerous limitations that 
exist.  With limitations and all, these recommendations are in line with competing 
arguments of today.  In reviewing them, a question is posed as to whether these 
recommendations are ones that can be implemented without degrading current 
capabilities.  In short, the answer is yes.  As long as lawmakers are willing to make the 
tough choices that are proven to be for the greater good, there should be no problem with 
implementing the aforementioned recommendations.   
Removing DHS from the IC would have negligible effect because it is not doing 
much as it stands today.  The transition out would only build a stronger case for creating 
a link between the FBI and state fusion center.  FEMA, on the other-hand, is an outlier.  
Its core mission is emergency management, which only responds to a terrorist event after 
it occurs; it does not have, nor has it ever had, anything to do with preventing them 
beforehand.  Emergency management is emergency management, regardless of whether 
an event occurs as a result of terrorism or a Category-5 hurricane, the response is 
virtually the same.   
C. THE WAY FORWARD 
This thesis did not conduct an all-inclusive study of the different agencies that 
make up DHS to determine whether it has outlived its usefulness.  Rather, it looked at 
two of the department’s most important functions—intelligence and emergency 
management.  In the future, studies of agencies like the Transportation Security Agency, 
Secret Service, or even the Coast Guard could also provide a deeper look into the 
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usefulness of having a department level agency responsible for preventing terrorism.  An 
assumption exists that looking at any of the department’s agencies would present 
questions of whether it functions as it should and how effective it is under DHS’s 
umbrella.  Additional cases are also available for study, especially the most recent 
hurricane and severe weather that hit the East Coast and have been named Superstorm 
Sandy.  Such research could provide a more in-depth look at the relationship between 
FEMA and the president during times of disasters.   
Initially, this study sought to recommend that DHS be dissolved.  But the truth 
behind building bureaucracies is that once they are in place they are very hard to remove, 
no matter how inefficient or ineffective they may be.  Because bureaucracies are built in 
the United States as a response to a problem, the American people become very 
dependent on them in a short amount of time.  This creates a dilemma for U.S. politicians 
who may feel that creating DHS was indeed an overreaction.  It is expected that there will 
be others who will dispute the recommendations presented in this thesis and view them as 
unnecessary because it is hard to breakdown bureaucracies.  If the overwhelming 
response is such, then this thesis offers one last recommendation: restructure DHS.   
Because a number of agencies within DHS have zero ties to preventing 
terrorism—i.e., FEMA and the Secret Service—an argument can be made that these 
agencies provide little value toward achieving DHS’s mission.  Lawmakers should 
consider restructuring DHS in a manner that gives it a more focused set of 
responsibilities.  A proposal for DHS would be to focus primarily on protecting 
America’s borders.  In order to do so, remove all other agencies and build the department 
around four of its current agencies: Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, and the Coast Guard.  
This structured approach will make DHS the premier defender of the nation’s borders—
land, sea, and air.  It will still have some insight into what goes on in the intelligence 
community through the Coast Guard, which was a member before joining DHS.  The 
difference will be that the department will not carry a huge burden tied to the 
responsibility it now carries for fusing information together.  As a partner in the overall 
homeland security network, the data generated will still be shared but the overall 
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responsibility for domestic intelligence will reside with the Office of Director of National 
Intelligence or the FBI if recommendation two above is implemented.   
Second, the congressional oversight that plagues DHS today would be reduced.  
There are more than 100 committees and subcommittees within the two congressional 
bodies that exercise some level of oversight of DHS.125  If each committee required one 
brief a month this would result in 1,200 briefing annually, which is more than the 365 
days in one year’s timeframe.   
Finally, common tasks and functions of protecting the borders will provide a level 
of synergy that will make the department relevant in that field.  Just as the armed services 
shared a common bond based on fighting the nation’s wars, those four DHS agencies 
also, today, share a common bond with protecting the land, sea, and air borders.  It only 
makes sense that the way forward for DHS is to downsize and refocus its mission on 
border security.   
  
                                                 
125 Paul Rosenzweig, Jenna Baker McNeill, and James Jay Carafano, “Stopping the Chaos:  A 
Proposal for Reorganization of Congressional Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security,” 
Heritage Foundation WebMemo 1, no. 3046 (November 4, 2010), Homeland Security Digital Library, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=14444.   
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